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Abstract. We are concerned here with how structural properties of language
may come to reflect features of the world in which it evolves. As a concrete
example, we will consider how a simple term language might evolve to sup-
port the principle of indifference over state descriptions in that language. The
point is not that one is justified in applying the principle of indifference to
state descriptions in natural language. Instead, it is that one should expect
a language that has evolved in the context of facilitating successful action to
reflect probabilistic features of the world in which it evolved.
1. Introduction
A simple term language might evolve to allow for effective communication in
the context of a Lewis-Skyrms signaling game (Lewis, 1969; Skyrms, 2006, 2010a).
Here we are concerned with how such an evolved language may reflect probabilistic
features of the world in which it evolved.
Specifically, we will consider how a simple evolutionary process might lead to a
language where unbiased priors over state expressions in the language accurately
represent the relative frequencies of the corresponding states of nature; this is a how-
possibly explanation (Hempel, 1965; Resnik, 1991).1 We examine how the structure
of a language might evolve to represent some statistical properties of the world
in such a way that a purported principle of rationality—namely, the principle of
indifference—actually obtains. The suggestion is not that there is evolutionary war-
rant for adopting a principle of indifference.2 The point, rather, is that one should
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expect a language that has evolved in the context of facilitating successful action
to reflect statistical features of the world in which it evolved. In the present case,
it does so in a way that supports a purported epistemic principle. That said, what
these features are more generally may be both subtle and difficult to determine.
We will start by considering how a language might evolve in the context of a
signaling game. We will then consider how such an evolved language might come
to reflect probabilistic properties of the world in which it evolved.
2. Basic Signaling and the Problem of Priors
In a basic two-agent 2×2×2 Lewis-Skyrms signaling game, there are two states
of nature, two types of signal, and two types of action—one matching each state
of nature. On a play of the game, one agent (the sender) sees the state of nature,
then chooses and sends one of the signals to the other agent (the receiver) who then
performs an action. The action is successful if and only if it matches the current
state of nature.
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Figure 1. A basic 2× 2× 2 signaling game
The two agents may evolve a signaling system over repeated plays of the game.
One way that this might occur is under simple reinforcement learning. Suppose that
the sender has two urns—one corresponding to each state of nature—and suppose
that each urn initially contains one ball of each of the two signal types. Similarly,
suppose that the receiver has two urns—one corresponding to each possible signal—
and suppose that each urn initially contains one ball of each of the two action types.
When the sender sees the current state of nature, she goes to her corresponding
urn, draws a ball at random, then sends the signal indicated by the ball. When the
receiver sees the signal, he goes to his corresponding urn, draws a ball at random,
and performs the action indicated by the ball. On simple reinforcement learning, if
the action matches the current state of nature (and is hence successful), then the
agents each return the ball they drew to the urn from which they drew it and add
another ball of the same type to that urn, thus making their successful action more
probable given the antecedent state or signal type. Otherwise, they just return the
ball they drew to the urn from which they drew it.
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If nature is unbiased, then the basic 2× 2× 2 signaling game will converge to an
optimal signaling system with probability one under this simple dynamics.3 Conver-
gence to a signaling system still occurs, but is less likely, under simple reinforcement
learning for an n× n× n signaling game the larger n > 2 and the more biased the
distribution of states of nature.
Language users may learn something concerning the nature of the world they
inhabit as they evolve a language appropriate for describing their world. Consider a
sender-predictor game, a slight variant of the signaling game just described.4 Sup-
pose that the state of nature is observed in the morning and that the action taken
by the receiver is a predictive action in the afternoon. One morning state might
be clear skies, with the corresponding successful afternoon action being take straw
hats to the picnic (because sun is more likely in the afternoon when it is clear in the
morning). The other morning state might be cloudy skies, with the corresponding
successful afternoon action being take umbrellas to the picnic (because rain is more
likely in the afternoon when it is cloudy in the morning). Suppose, in the present
case, that a morning state does not guarantee the corresponding afternoon state—it
just makes it probable. Finally, suppose the sender tracks how often each of her
terms, in fact, leads to successful action given the correlation between morning and
afternoon states.
In this game, under simple reinforcement learning, if the morning state deter-
mines the probability of each afternoon state, then the sender will typically both
evolve a successful signaling language and learn the probabilities of the receiver’s
prediction being true given the signal she sent him. Here precisely the same expe-
rience that allows her to evolve a successful descriptive language may also provide
her with reliable estimates that might serve as effective priors for the receiver’s
predictions.5
There is a sense in which one might take such a story to solve the problem of
priors—the worry that a belief revision model of knowledge requires one to assign
prior probabilities that are then updated over time, when there is no agreed-upon
rational principle for how to initially assign prior probabilities. In the model just
described, reliable, effective priors for success, given a description of the current
state in the evolved language, co-evolve with the meanings of such descriptions.
Indeed, if the agents evolving the language pay attention to how well it works as
they evolve it, the ‘prior’ they assign to successful action, given a description of
the current state, is not well understood as a prior at all. Rather, such ‘priors’ are
expectations that are grounded in the long experience that led to the evolution
3See Argiento et al. (2009) for details.
4See Barrett (2014b) for a discussion of such games more generally.
5See Barrett (2014a) for a detailed description of this particular sender-predictor game, its behav-
ior, a discussion of the problem of priors, and a proposed dissolution of the problem.
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of a useful predictive language. On this view, one never faces the problem of as-
signing prior probabilities to descriptions with no relevant background knowledge
whatsoever. If one is ever assigning probabilities over evolved descriptions, then one
already knows how to use a language that was forged in the context of success and
failure in action, which means that one also has substantial knowledge regarding
the world and how it works.
Here, in contrast, we will consider how the structure of an evolved language may
come to mirror the structure of the world in which it evolved. Specifically, we will
consider how a simple term language may evolve under plausible generic conditions
to make unbiased priors over descriptions in the language reliable. Again, the point
is not that one is in any way justified in accepting the principle of indifference over
a natural language. Rather, it is that a language that evolves in the context of its
usefulness will mirror features of the world where it evolved. Even so, while they
may know well that their evolved language facilitates successful action, there is no
reason to suppose that the agents who use it will know precisely how its structure
mirrors their world.6
3. The Principle of Indifference
The principle of indifference says that, in the absence of other information, one
should assign probability 1/n to each of n specifiable possibilities. If one’s language
individuates between six sides of a die, for example, the principle would recommend
that one assign a probability of 1/6 to each possible outcome on this representation.
On its face, this principle tells one how to assign prior probabilities and so appears
to provide a solution to the problem of priors; however, implementing a solution
along these lines poses serious conceptual difficulties.
As a basic principle of reason, the principle of indifference has little to recom-
mend it. As indicated by how we just characterized the principle, it depends on
how one individuates between states. This, in turn, depends on one’s language and
associated conceptual scheme. The problem is that the principle of indifference typ-
ically provides different recommendations for how one ought to assign probabilities
to a given possibility for different partitions of possibilities. Under the description
that the outcome of a toss of the six-sided die might be any of six possibilities one
to six, the principle would recommend assigning probability 1/6 to getting a one.
But under the description that the outcome of the toss might be the number one
or not the number one, the principle would recommend assigning probability 1/2
to getting the outcome the number one and probability 1/2 to getting the outcome
not the number one. If one takes there to be a matter of fact regarding whether a
6See Barrett (2007) and Purves (2018) for explanations of this sort of failure.
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probability assignment is reliable, then at most one of these recommendations can
be right.
One might object that the second partition (between the number one or not the
number one) is less natural than the first (between each of the six possibilities one to
six ). But the naturalness of a partition depends on one’s background commitments,
the context at hand, and the specific representational features of one’s language. If
one happened to believe that the die was weighted in such a way that was strongly
biased toward the number one, then the second partition might well seem the more
natural.
Bas van Fraassen’s (1989) cube factory story illustrates the general point.7 Sup-
pose one only knows that a factory produces cubes with a side between 0 and 2
meters. If one considers side-length, one might imagine that a principle of indiffer-
ence requires that one take the probability of a randomly selected cube having a
side between 0 and 1 to be 1/2, since side-lengths range from 0 to 2. If one considers
volume, one might imagine that a principle of indifference requires that one take
the probability of a randomly selected cube having a volume between 0 and 1 to
be 1/4, since volumes range from 0 to 4. But since having a side length between 0
and 1 is the same thing as having a volume between 0 and 1, the different parti-
tions, each perfectly natural given different interests, yield inconsistent probability
assignments.
The moral here has two parts: (1) the principle of indifference makes no recom-
mendations whatsoever without a specified partition since different partitions yield
inconsistent probability assignments, and (2) the partition that one finds most
natural will depend on one’s interests and the representational structure of one’s
language.
If the principle of indifference were in fact a basic principle of reason, something
should go wrong if an agent were not to use it. It is worth noting, however, that
it is entirely unclear what such bad consequences might be. A good Bayesian may
assign any set of coherent, non-dogmatic priors (that is, probabilities that satisfy
the standard axioms of probability theory and are neither zero nor one) to her n hy-
potheses without fear of finding herself committed to a Dutch Book or failing to
respond appropriately to relevant evidence. And, as she conditions on evidence, she
will expect that her degrees of belief will reflect relative frequencies in nature.8
That said, a language may evolve in such a way that it supports the principle
of indifference. More specifically, the terms in the evolved language may come to
partition nature in such a way that the principle of indifference assigns probabilities
7See also Bertrand (1889).
8Another well-known problem with the principle of indifference is that it leads to complications
and inconsistencies on infinite domains (Keynes, 1921). This will not concern us here, given that
all of our examples are finite.
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over the partitions that are, in fact, approximately equal to the observed relative
frequency of each type of state in nature. Here we will consider one way in which
this might happen. This illustrates how statistical facts concerning the nature of
the world might condition the structure of a language that evolves by way of success
and failure in the context of that world.
4. The Evolution of Indifference
Consider a signaling game just like the 2 × 2 × 2 game above, but where there
are more states of nature and corresponding acts than there are expressions that
the sender might use to signal the receiver. Here the agents lack the expressive
resources to evolve a language that perfectly communicates the current state of
nature. While an evolved language will never be perfectly successful, it might be
more or less optimal given the agents’ expressive constraints.
Note that there are several extensions of the basic signaling game which we do
not consider here. One might, for example, consider a version of the game where
there are more terms than there are relevant states, giving rise to synonyms—
namely, states may come to be represented by more than one signal so that the
sender strategy is one-to-many (Skyrms, 2010a; Hu et al., 2011). In games like this,
terms are rarely equiprobable. Here players may evolve to fully represent nature
with their communicative resources. This is not true when there are more states
than signals.
The syntactic games considered in Barrett (2006, 2007, 2009) also provide models
where the evolved language may partition nature. However, concatenating signals
in such games, again, provides a means for fully representing the states of nature.
There are many ways in which language may evolve to partition nature. Not all
of these will be relevant for a principle of indifference.9 Here we are concerned with
a simple model for how language may evolve to partition nature in cases where
the agents do not have sufficient linguistic resources to fully represent the states of
nature. As we will see, this model may lead to a language that partitions nature in
a way that supports a principle of indifference.
When there are more states than terms, a language may evolve where each
state of nature triggers the sender to send a particular corresponding term. If so,
the evolved terms partition the states of nature. Each term is associated with an
element of the partition containing the states that correspond to that term.
The most efficient signaling system the agents might evolve would be one that
communicates the most information about the current state of nature per signal.10
9See also O’Connor (2017), who discusses interactions between structures in the world and struc-
tures in language in signaling games, and Purves (2018).
10This is sometimes referred to as the maximum entropy principle. It is closely tied to the principle
of indifference, but for reasons discussed in the last section and later in the paper, we do not take
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The mean self-information of a signal on a partition of nature is given by∑
i
−pi log pi,
where pi is the probability associated with element i of the partition. This expression
is maximal when the probabilities corresponding to each element of the partition
are equal. The agents’ evolved language communicates the most information per
signal if the probability of each type of signal is equal; this occurs when the signals
partition the states of nature into equally probable sets.11
Since a language where the terms partition nature into equally probable sets
allows the agents to communicate the most information per signal, one might expect
such a language to evolve in a special context where agents are somehow rewarded
for precisely this sort of efficient communication. But a special efficiency reward
is not a necessary condition for the evolution of a simple, efficient term language.
Indeed, languages that induce an unbiased partition over states often evolve in the
context of simple reinforcement learning alone. And when the induced partition
is not precisely unbiased, it is typically very close. That this occurs is perhaps
particularly salient given the simplicity of reinforcement learning and the fact that
it is ubiquitous in nature.12
4.1. Unbiased States. We will start with an unbiased 10× 2× 10 signaling game
(a game with ten equiprobable states of nature, two terms, and ten acts, one corre-
sponding to each of the states). Here the sender has ten urns, one for each state of
nature, each starting with one ball of each of the two signal types, and the receiver
has two urns, one for each signal type, each starting with one ball for each of the
nine act types. As above, we will suppose that both the sender and receiver learn by
simple reinforcement. Since each type of natural state is equiprobable, an evolved
language on a 10×2×10 signaling game will partition the states into equiprobable
sets if and only if each term comes to be triggered by precisely five of the types
of state. We will represent this partition as (5, 5) and the other possible partitions
similarly.
The chance payoff for this game is 1/10, and the maximal payoff, if the agents
evolve a perfectly effective term language, is 1/5.13 Over 1000 runs with 106 plays
maximum entropy to provide any justification whatsoever for adopting the principle of indifference.
See Jaynes (1957); Williamson (2010) for contrary views on this issue.
11See Shannon (1948); Shannon and Weaver (1949). For a careful analysis of information in the
context of signaling games, see Skyrms (2010a,b).
12For empirical work on reinforcement learning in nature, see Rescorla and Wagner (1972); Roth
and Erev (1995); Schultz et al. (1997); Erev and Roth (1998); Schultz (2004). For an introduction
to reinforcement learning in a computational framework, see Sutton and Barto (1998).
13Every partition that takes advantage of both signals, that is, every partition except (0, 10) and
(10, 0)—which are dynamically unstable—has the same expected payoff as long as the sender and
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Figure 2. evolving an unbiased partition
per run, the average expected payoff at the end of each run is 0.1999.14 This con-
vergence is relatively quick: after 4853 plays, on average, the agents are within 5%
of their final expected payoff.15 Most runs (0.875) achieve a cumulative success rate
of at least 0.1990.16
The unbiased (5, 5) partition is indeed most common of the 9 stable partitions.
Nearly 1/3 of the time (0.310), the sender and receiver perfectly partition nature for
maximal information transfer on the equiprobable (5,5) partition. And most of the
time (0.792), the sender and receiver partition nature near-perfectly by evolving a
(5, 5), (6, 4), or (4, 6) partition. While it is rare, the sender and receiver sometimes
(0.031) fail to evolve a clear partition of nature on 106 plays.
Figure 3 gives the distribution of runs for the 10 × 2 × 10 game under simple
reinforcement. The dashed line represents the mean information per signal over the
distribution, and the smooth line represents the number of ways that each type of
partition might be achieved. A natural explanation for why simple reinforcement
typically leads to a term language that induces an equiprobable or nearly equiprob-
able partition over the possible states of nature is that there are simply more ways
to get such a partition given a maximally successful language. That said, the likeli-
hood of less even partitions drops off even faster than the number of ways to get the
less even partitions. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test of the empirical distribution
against a distribution sampled from the combinatorial expectation yields a p-value
receiver coordinate upon the partition and regardless of what weight the receiver puts on each
action conditional upon the relevant signal. See LaCroix (2020) for details.
14The average expected payoff is calculated from the evolved dispositions of the agents (that is,
from their actual urn contents) at the end of the run given the unbiased (or biased as in the next
section) states of nature.
15The fastest run achieves this payoff within 1801 plays and the slowest after 25995 plays. 0.90
runs are within 5% of their final expected payoff prior to the first 7500 plays.
16The cumulative success rate is a measure of success that takes account of the history of the
game. It is calculated by dividing the number of plays that led to a success by the total number
of plays in that run. When the players are successful, early failures are washed out as the number
of plays increases.
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Figure 3. Partitioning 10 states with 2 signals with unbiased na-
ture. Comparison of experimental results with combinatorial ex-
pectation and information transfer
of 0.0017 for the 10 × 2 × 10 signaling game, suggesting that the combinatorial
expectations do not by themselves explain the empirical results. See Figure 4.17
Figure 4. Comparison of the CDFs for our observed data and
the theoretical expectation
17To provide a bit more detail, the null hypothesis is that the combinatorial distribution and
the empirical distribution are identical for the 10 × 2 × 10 signaling game. The K-S test gives
the statistic D = 0.0843, which is the supremum of the set of distances between the empirical
distribution function we observe and the expected distribution function from the combinatorial
measure. This corresponds to a p-value of 0.0017; hence one might reject the null hypothesis with
high confidence.
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One observes the same phenomena in the unbiased 9×3×9 signaling game (with
nine equiprobable states of nature, three terms, and nine acts, one corresponding
to each of the states). Suppose again that both the sender and receiver learn by
simple reinforcement.
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Figure 5. evolving an unbiased partition
Here, the chance payoff for the 9× 3× 9 game is 1/9, and the maximal expected
payoff is 1/3. On 1000 runs with 106 plays per run, the average expected payoff at
the end of a run is 0.3332. The vast majority of runs (0.926) achieve a near-perfect
expected payoff greater than 0.333, and every run (1.000) achieves an expected
payoff greater than 0.330. Moreover, learning is fast: after 6495 plays, on average,
the agents are within 5% of their final expected payoff.18 The cumulative success
rate is 0.3323 after 106 plays per run, on average (1000 runs), and almost every
(0.990) run achieved a cumulative success rate of at least 0.330.
Again, the unbiased (3, 3, 3) partition is most common of the 28 stable partitions.
About 1/6 of the time (0.160), the sender and receiver perfectly partition nature for
maximal information transfer. And more than 2/3 of the time (0.684), the sender
and receiver partition nature near-perfectly by evolving either the (3, 3, 3) partition
or one of the six permutations of the (4, 3, 2) partition. Very rarely (0.031), the
sender and receiver fail to evolve a clear partition of nature.
Figure 5 illustrates the results of the simulation. Note again that the game tracks
equiprobable partitions even better than the combinatorial measure over the num-
ber of ways of getting each type of partition. These results are more disparate than
in the 10 × 2 × 10 game.19 In this spirit, the results in the next section further
illustrate, in a dramatic way, why the combinatorial measure alone cannot be used
to explain the partitions that evolve under simple reinforcement.
4.2. Biased States. The natural next step is to consider whether a term language
might evolve under simple reinforcement to partition states into equiprobable sets
180.90 runs are within 5% of their final expected payoff prior to the first 9500 plays.
19A K-S test of the empirical distribution against a distribution sampled from the combinatorial
expectation yields the statistic D = 0.1912, with a p-value p < 0.0001, suggesting again that the
combinatorial expectations do not by themselves explain the empirical results.
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Figure 6. Partitioning 9 states with 3 signals with unbiased na-
ture. Comparison of experimental results with combinatorial ex-
pectation and information transfer
when those states are not themselves equiprobable. This is what would be required
for the principle of indifference to be applicable in any robust sense for the present
model. Note that if this is true, then it cannot be the number of ways of achieving
a particular partition that drives the evolution of partitions as the equiprobable
partitions over strongly biased states are correspondingly special.
Consider the 10× 2× 10 game where nature is biased as indicated by the vector
〈1/2, 1/18, 1/18, 1/18, 1/18, 1/18, 1/18, 1/18, 1/18, 1/18〉
for states 0 through 9 respectively. If signals and actions are themselves random
with no bias, then the expected chance payoff is 0.10, and if the two signals are
used optimally, then the maximal expected payoff is 10/18 ≈ 0.5556.
On simulation under simple reinforcement learning, the expected payoff given the
evolved urn contents is, on average, 0.5502 after 106 plays per run over 1000 runs.
Many runs (0.8989) achieve an expected payoff of better than 0.55 with this number
of plays. Convergence here is relatively fast. After 1999 plays, on average, the agents
are within 5% of their final expected payoff.20 The cumulative success rate is, on
average, 0.5496 after 106 plays, and many runs (0.887) achieve a cumulative success
better than 0.55.
Most of the time (0.897), the players learn to partition nature, and they almost
always evolve an unbiased, or nearly unbiased, partition over the states. On the
sender end, the most common partition (0.570) is one where she uses one term
for the most common state and the other for the other eight states. Of course,
200.90 runs are within 5% of their final expected payoff prior to the first 2200 plays.
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which term evolves to be used for what on a particular run is entirely random.
Of these runs where the players do learn to partition nature, about 1/4 of the
time (0.281), she pools a second state into the signal containing the biased state.
Sometimes (0.082), she pools two extra states into the signal containing the biased
state. And rarely (0.008), she pools three extra states into the signal containing
the biased state for a (4, 6) or (6, 4) partition, with approximately equal frequency.
Given this particular natural bias, we never see the sender evolve a (5, 5) partition
on simulation. On the receiver end, when the sender pools an extra state into
the signal that contains the biased state, the receiver always chooses the action
corresponding to the biased state when he sees that signal.
Given the strength of the bias and the simplicity of the learning dynamics, it
is perhaps unsurprising that the receiver sometimes (0.083) learns to completely
ignore the signal and just do the action corresponding to the biased state. Here the
players cannot expect to do better than a success rate of 0.5. Sometimes (0.020),
we see the receiver putting nearly full weight on the action corresponding to the
biased state for one signal type and mixing over the biased state and other states
on the other signal type.
One sees similar behavior in the biased 9×3×9 game. Consider the natural bias
〈1/3, 1/3, 1/21, 1/21, 1/21, 1/21, 1/21, 1/21, 1/21〉
over the nine states 0 through 8. Here, the expected chance payoff for unbiased
random signaling is 1/9, and the maximal expected payoff is 15/21 ≈ 0.7142. On
simulation, we see an average expected payoff of 0.6970 after 106 plays per run over
1000 runs. Most runs (0.794) achieve an expected payoff of at least 0.71 after 106
plays. And again, the evolutionary speed is good. After 5406 plays, on average, the
agents are within 5% of their final expected payoff.21 Most runs (0.742) achieve a
cumulative success greater than 0.71 over 106 plays.
Most of the time (0.772), the sender and receiver evolve a clear partition of the
states. Again, the evolved partition tends to be close to unbiased and hence close
to optimal. The most common partition (0.347) is one where the sender assigns
one biased state to one signal, the other biased state to the other signal, and the
remaining seven states to the third signal. Next most often (0.325), the sender pools
an extra state with one of the signals that contains one of the biased states. More
biased natural partitions are increasingly less common. The least common partition
is one where the sender assigns three states to each of the three terms.22 Again,
when the sender pools other states into the signal containing one of the biased
210.90 runs are within 5% of their final expected payoff prior to the first 10000 plays.
22A (5, 3, 1) partition occurs 0.073, a (4, 4, 1) partition occurs 0.019, a (5, 2, 2) partition occurs
0.066, a (4, 3, 2) partition occurs 0.030, and a (3, 3, 3) partition occurs 0.005. In each case, the
distinct permutations of these partitions occur with roughly equal frequency.
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states, the receiver learns to ignore the action associated with these extra states
and puts all weight for that signal onto the act associated with the biased state.
The agents sometimes fail to evolve a clear partition on 106 plays. Sometimes
(0.034), for example, the sender pools both of the biased actions into one signal,
and the receiver mixes over the appropriate actions, given that signal. The receiver
perfectly partitions the remaining seven states into the other two signals, and the
receiver mixes over the appropriate actions, conditional upon the signal received.
This strategy has an expected payoff of 9/21 ≈ 0.4286. Mixtures between this and
the clear partition cases are also observed with somewhat higher expected success
rates.
5. Discussion
These models illustrate how expressions in a simple term language might evolve
to represent equiprobable partitions of the fine-grained states of nature in a simple
evolutionary context. From the perspective of the evolved language, it will look like
every natural possibility is equiprobable. While this is manifestly not the case for the
fine-grained states in the biased models, it is nevertheless often the case for those
models that every expressible possibility in the evolved language is equiprobable
or nearly so. Recall from the discussion in Sections 2 and 3 that the principle of
indifference, at first glance, provides a solution to the problem of priors insofar as it
tells one how to assign prior probabilities. However, in our models, the principle of
indifference holds over the partition induced by the evolved expressions not because
each fine-grained state of nature is, in fact, equiprobable but because, under the
special circumstances that obtain here, the language evolves to partition nature
into expressible states that are equiprobable.
Of course, this does not mean that one should expect the principle of indifference
to hold for natural language generally. Even the relatively simple signaling languages
of animals are often much more complex and expressive than the sort of term
languages we have been considering here.23 With a more expressive language, one
might characterize different partitions over natural states, and one may have every
reason to suppose that the principle of indifference will give the wrong probabilities
23For example, the data presented in the original studies of Seyfarth et al. (1980a,b) on vervet
monkey alarm-call systems indicated substantial variation in responses and that the responses
are probabilistic rather than deterministic. Furthermore, vervets do not just vocalize for alarm
calls. They also call when they find food, in aggressive confrontations, and during sexual activity,
among others. Vervets additionally vocalize via grunting in a variety of circumstances: (a) when
a submissive meets a dominant individual, (b) when a dominant meets a submissive individual,
(c) when one vervet goes out into an open area, and (d) when a vervet comes across an out-
group conspecific (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1982, 1990). Schlenker et al. (2016) provide a linguistic
analysis of approximately 40 years of data from experimental primatology, which displays several
complexities of monkey communication systems. This highlights but some of the myriad ways in
which the world is significantly more complex than the model which we use to represent it.
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for most of these. Even if one restricts consideration to simple term languages like
those discussed here, the language may evolve by means of something other than
simple reinforcement, and the resulting language may well not support the principle
of indifference.24 And even with simple reinforcement, as we have seen, the principle
of indifference does not always work for the evolved language—it just works on most
runs of the present special models.
The moral, then, is not that there is any evolutionary warrant for adopting the
principle of indifference or for supposing that natural language usually evolves to
be maximally informative. There isn’t, and it doesn’t. Rather, it is that however
a natural language evolves, inasmuch as it is forged in the context of success and
failure in action, those features of the world that helped to shape the language may
be reflected in the evolved language’s structure. Further, this may occur in such
a way that the principle of indifference over the evolved linguistic partition itself
evolves to be a reliable epistemic guide. As a language evolves, one should expect it
come to reflect various bits of structure in the world in which it evolved. A language
may be influenced by social factors (Lupyan and Dale, 2010) or environmental
factors (Kemp et al., 2019).25 What we have shown are the conditions under which
the structure of a language might evolve to represent statistical properties of the
world in such a way that a purported principle of rationality in fact obtains. Put
another way, we have shown how a purported principle of rationality may be reliable
contingent upon the way the world is actually partitioned by the language used to
describe that world. Concretely, we have shown the conditions under which the
principle of indifference obtains.
If one knew how the structure of a language was influenced by the world it
evolved in, one might infer properties of the world, like the relative frequencies
of natural states in the present models, from the structure of the language. But,
for real languages, these relations will be extremely subtle, as subtle as the evolu-
tionary contexts where the language was forged. And one should not expect these
relations to provide general principles of reason nor even any epistemic short cuts.
Determining precisely how the contingent structure of a natural language may re-
flect the structure of the world in which it evolved is highly nontrivial. Here we
have provided a concrete example of how one might study a very simple epistemic
relationship between the structure of the world and the evolved structure of a basic
signaling language.
24See Barrett and Zollman (2009) for several learning dynamics that typically behave very dif-
ferently than simple reinforcement learning. As a quick and very simple example, the learning
dynamics win-stay/lose-shift would not even evolve a stable language in the present games, let
alone one that supported the principle of indifference.
25There is an extensive literature in cognitive science that seeks to quantify how language might
reflect the structure of the world. See Lupyan and Dale (2016) for an overview and discussion of
the linguistic niche hypothesis.
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